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patterns—a crucial component of the safety net for the elderly. Drawing on the 2014 Global Findex 
database, which provides individual-level data on the use of financial products in more than 140 countries, 
we examine how adults save for old age. We find that about 25% of adults worldwide save for old age, 
with rates exceeding 35% in high-income OECD economies and the East Asia and Pacific region. On 
average, men are slightly more likely than women to save for this purpose, but the gender gap is deeper in 
developing countries. Worldwide, saving for old age is more common among older adults, more educated 
adults, and adults who own accounts. Adults in countries with English or German legal origin, and with 
high savings rates, are also more likely to save for old age. We also find that measures to increase trust in 
the financial system—such as deposit insurance—lead to higher rates of saving for old age. Finally, we 
find no evidence of substitution between pension system provisions and contribution rates with saving for 
old age. 
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7Determinants of Saving for Old Age
around the World
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Leora Klapper, and Georgios A. Panos
Programs catering to the ﬁnancial well-being of the elderly are experiencing
strains around the world. The depletion of public coffers during the ﬁnan-
cial crisis has left governments struggling to cope with rising retirement costs
triggered by aging populations, low birthrates, and weakened informal
safety nets (Ellis et al. 2014). That this crisis threatens both the elderly and
the young is well-established; it also endangers future generations, who will
shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs of caring for older gener-
ations directly or indirectly (Gratton 1996; Fridson 2015).
Despite rising interest in the safety net for elderly people, there is limited
information on the determinants of both formal and informal voluntary
saving for old age. Drawing on new microeconomic data, this chapter offers
a detailed descriptive analysis of old age saving around the world and across
geographic regions. It also features an empirical analysis of the determin-
ants of old age saving, using detailed individual characteristics, country
macroeconomic characteristics, and country pension system characteristics.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study examining old age saving around the
world using detailed global micro-data.
The 2014 Global Findex data reveal how and why adults save and borrow,
and it also sheds light on their ﬁnancial resilience to unexpected shocks
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015). In 2014, 56 percent of adults around the world
reported having saved money in the past 12 months. Adults in high-income
OECD economies, as well as in East Asia and the Paciﬁc, were the most likely
to have done so, with 71 percent reporting that they had saved, followed by
60 percent of adults in Sub-Saharan Africa. In other regions, the ﬁgure stood
at between 30 and 40 percent. The 2014 Global Findex survey also asked
about three speciﬁc reasons for saving. While marked differences emerge
across regions, almost 25 percent of adults worldwide reported having saved
for old age in the past year. A similar share reported saving for education
expenses, while 14 percent reported saving to start, expand, or operate a
business. The percentage of adults saving for old age also varies considerably
across economies: 39.7 percent in high-income OECD countries (hereafter
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OECDHI); 36.6 percent in East Asia and the Paciﬁc (hereafter EAP); 11.8
percent in Europe and Central Asia (hereafter ECA); 10.6 percent in Latin
America and the Caribbean (hereafter LAC); 9.8 percent in Sub-Saharan
Africa; 9.1 percent in South Asia; and 7.0 percent in the Middle East and
North Africa (hereafter MENA).
Our ﬁndings show a small gender gap in saving for old age, though it is
larger in developing countries, as well as large differences based on educa-
tion and employment status. All regions other than EAP exhibit patterns of
higher old age saving among those with higher education. In every region,
employed adults are far more likely to save for old age than unemployed
adults, with the exception of South Asia. In terms of the age distribution,
saving for old age rises sharply in the 36–45 age group, with delayed occur-
rence taking place in LAC, MENA, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Large income disparities are also evident, with the richest centile being
much more likely to save for old age, and the bottom centile far less likely.
Adults who have accounts at a ﬁnancial institution or a mobile money
account are about 40 to 50 percent more likely to save for old age than
adults lacking such an account. Furthermore, our empirical estimates ﬁnd a
strong signiﬁcant relationship between the probability of saving for old age
and ﬁnancial inclusion, a country’s generic saving propensity, legal origin,
and education. Residents of countries with English legal origin are more
likely to save for old age, with an effect equal to 15 to 20 percent, versus
countries with French legal origin. Residents of countries with higher gen-
eric saving rates are much more likely to save for old age, echoing Chen
(2013), who proposed a strong cultural component shaping the propensity
to save. Moreover, there is a positive relationship with GDP per capita, while
interest rates and deposit insurance have insigniﬁcant effects. In addition,
we ﬁnd evidence that institutional arrangements enabling greater trust in
the ﬁnancial system, in terms of the safety net/moral hazard index based on
deposit insurance, are conducive to increasing rates of old age saving
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2014).
Finally, the results of our empirical analysis show a moderate negative
association with the size of pension beneﬁts, a positive relationship with
pension coverage, and a positive link to contributions and contribution
ratios. It is also the case that a higher housing affordability index is positively
related to old age saving in the majority of regions, with the exception of
Sub-Saharan Africa, where the impact is insigniﬁcant. We interpret the latter
ﬁndings to be in line with Poterba et al. (1995), who suggested little substi-
tution between pension system provisions and contribution rates (and other
forms of ﬁnancial saving in the case of housing affordability) and saving for
old age.
The next section reviews the existing literature, and the following one
describes the data and presents the descriptive statistics for saving for old
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/8/2016, SPi
122 Retirement System Risk Management
age around the world. Then we present the empirical analysis of old age
saving, in terms of empirical strategy and estimation results with sets of
individual, macroeconomic, and pension-system characteristics.
Review of Existing Literature
Research has long shown that retirees suffer from a variety of economic
hardships even in developed economies with relatively strong pension sys-
tems. In their study of the United States, Bernheim et al. (2001) show that
consumption dropped rapidly at the time of retirement and decreased even
more post-retirement. Using UK data, Bardasi et al. (2000) reported that, on
average, economic wellbeing declined sharply in the years preceding retire-
ment, and continued to do so through retirement,1 with women facing a
swifter decline than men. Among adults in Germany, satisfaction with cur-
rent household income decreased substantially on retirement, while satis-
faction with free time increased, according to Bonsang and Klein (2011).
Retirement had an overall negative effect on life satisfaction, with larger
effects for involuntary retirement, and insigniﬁcant effects for voluntary
retirement.
High levels of poverty among the elderly compound the negative economic
consequences of retirement. In the US, Clark and Quinn (1999) reported
that the elderly remain disproportionally represented among the near poor.
Also, certain older Americans still face substantial risk of economic depriv-
ation, even though their average economic wellbeing has signiﬁcantly
improved compared to older generations (Sabelhaus and Manchester
1995). Crystal and Shea (1990) also showed that elderly resources were
distributed even more unequally than the rest of the population.
A number of studies has examined post-recession policy responses to
these challenges. Galasso (2008) ran simulations based on the political
determinants of social security contribution rates and retirement ages, and
he concluded that the retirement age is likely to increase in each country,
regardless of political constraints. However, according to Andersen (2008),
indexing beneﬁts and retirement ages to longevity did not ensure ﬁnancial
viability of the social security system. Recognizing this, Poterba (2014)
suggested that individuals bear a larger share of the responsibility for
determining their retirement security.2
According to Papke (2004), allowing participants a choice of investment
options may increase their retirement savings. However, Lusardi (2003)
reported that little is known about how households make saving plans and
how they collect information to make savings decisions. A survey of house-
holds by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2014)
found that almost half of respondents had given little or no thought to
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retirement savings. Among those who had, many either did not plan to
retire, expected to keep working into retirement to pay for expenses, or
did not know how they would pay for their retirement.3 Nearly a third had
no retirement savings or pension. These retirement planning challenges
had been exacerbated by the recession, which resulted in many respondents
delaying their planned retirement.4
Firms have also shifted from deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions to deﬁned
contribution (DC) pensions, where employees have to decide how much
money to put into their retirement funds and how to allocate their pension
wealth. But DC plans have their critics, who draw on the behavioral eco-
nomics and ﬁnance literature.5 For instance, Banks and Oldﬁeld (2007)
reported that the elderly suffer from greater cognitive, gender, and educa-
tion gaps than other groups. As a result, they are less likely to have savings
accounts, own shares in a company, or have private pensions. Lusardi and
Mitchell (2011, 2014) reported that ﬁnancial literacy is a signiﬁcant deter-
minant of retirement planning for all age groups, with elderly people
suffering from the highest levels of ﬁnancial illiteracy.
Recent research by Chen (2013) identiﬁed a cultural component in
saving and retirement planning behavior, such that speakers of languages
that grammatically associate the future and the present save more and retire
with more wealth. In addition, Duﬂo and Saez (2002) reported that peer
effects drive retirement plan participation decisions. Duﬂo and Saez (2003)
presented quasi-experimental evidence that an individual’s decision about
how much to save for retirement was affected by small changes in his
environment and that network effects inﬂuence participation decisions.
Instead of education, Benartzi and Thaler (2007) proposed a method
of inﬂuencing decisions about retirement saving plans based on the prin-
ciples of ‘automatic enrollment.’ This involved implementing acute auto-
enrollment, sensible default options, and opportunities to increase savings
rates and rebalance portfolios automatically. Such design features help less
sophisticated investors while maintaining ﬂexibility for more knowledgeable
participants.
Financial security for the elderly and economic growth are best served
when governments adopt three pillars of old age security:6 (1) a publicly
managed pension system with mandatory participation and the limited goal
of reducing poverty among the elderly; (2) a privately managed mandatory
savings system; and (3) voluntary savings. The ﬁrst pillar caters to redistri-
bution, the second and third cover savings, and all three co-insure against
the many risks of old age.7 Spreading the insurance function across all three
pillars creates greater income security for the old and provides greater
insurance than any single pillar system. Valdés-Prieto (2002a, 2002b) reviewed
the potential costs and beneﬁts of ‘three-pillar’ programs, deﬁned as those
that use incentives to promote voluntary old age saving. Among the beneﬁts
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of voluntary saving are the relative ease of accessing and mobilizing funds,
and the prevention of potential labor market distortions. Yet voluntary
savings programs may produce social costs, particularly when they involve
ﬁscal incentives.8
To develop measures to improve the ﬁnancial well-being of the elderly
and incorporate an element of self-control in retirement planning, policy-
makers must ﬁrst understand worldwide retirement savings patterns. In the
next sections, we evaluate these patterns using a binary measure of saving for
old age, which captures whether an individual has saved for old age during
the last year. Data limitations prevent us from measuring the volume of
savings for old age. Nonetheless, examining savings behavior reveals a rich
picture of results to inform policy design.
Who Saves for Old Age?
The data
We use data from the Global Findex database, which illustrates how people
save, borrow, make payments, and manage risk.9 It is the world’s most
comprehensive dataset providing consistent measures of ﬁnancial service
usage across economies and over time. The data were collected in partner-
ship with Gallup, Inc. and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The
survey was carried out over the 2014 calendar year as part of the Gallup
World Poll, which since 2005 has continually conducted surveys of approxi-
mately 1,000 people in each of more than 160 economies and in over 140
languages, using randomly selected, nationally representative samples.10
Descriptive statistics
Our analysis employs a representative sample of 143 economies and 147,692
individuals, age 18 and older.11 We use a binary variable (0/1) of the
response to the question: ‘In the past 12 months, have you saved for old
age?’ Figure 7.1 presents a global map,12 and Figure 7.2 shows the percent-
age of adults who saved any money for old age during the last year by
regional classiﬁcation. The weighted global ﬁgure for saving for old age
around the world is 24.8 percent. The top performers are Thailand, where
59.2 percent of the population saves for old age, Germany (55.1 percent),
Malaysia (54.0 percent), Canada (51.7 percent), and New Zealand (51.5
percent). The bottom performers in terms of saving for old age are Niger
(0.9 percent), Georgia (0.9 percent), the Republic of Yemen (1.4 percent),
Jordan (1.9 percent), and Armenia (2.1 percent). The top performing
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Figure 7.1 Saving for old age around the world
Note : Global FINDEX data 2015  Weighted averages.
Source : Derived from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015).
O
U
P
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
–
FIN
A
L
,
30/8/2016,
SP
i
region is OECDHI, though an interesting outlier is Greece amidst the debt-
crisis, with 9.3 percent of the population saving for old age.
The bars in Figure 7.2 further distinguish between saving for old age and
ﬁnancial inclusion status, in terms of having an account at a bank or formal
ﬁnancial institution. It can be seen that 84.7 percent of the individuals who
save for old age around the world are ﬁnancially included, with the remain-
ing 15.3 percent being ﬁnancially excluded. The low ﬁgures in certain
regions such as ECA and MENA could be indicative of the usage of alterna-
tive means of old age saving, such as livestock, gold, and stufﬁng money
under the mattress. It could also be indicative of less liquid means of saving
for old age, like home ownership.
Figure 7.3 presents the gender distribution of old age saving around the
world and by region. The global gender gap in terms of saving for old age is
in the magnitude of 2.5 percentage points (10.5 percent), with 26 percent of
men saving versus 23.5 percent of women, globally. Notably, this is lower
than the 9 percentage point gap in account ownership around the world.
The gap is largest in South Asia and smallest in EAP, which also has the
highest absolute old age saving rates.
Figure 7.4 presents educational gaps in terms of saving for old age. The
global education gap is wider between tertiary and secondary education,
compared to the respective gap between secondary and primary education
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Figure 7.2 Saving rates (%) for old age around the world by ﬁnancial inclusion status
and region
Source : Adapted from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015).
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Figure 7.3 Saving rates (%) for old age around the world by gender and region
Source : Adapted from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015).
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Figure 7.4 Saving rates (%) for old age around the world by educational attainment
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(or less). Speciﬁcally, 37.9 percent of individuals with tertiary education save
for retirement, compared to 27 percent of individuals with secondary edu-
cation and 22.2 percent of individuals with primary education or less. The
old age saving gap seems to be much wider between the tertiary and
secondary education groups, compared to the gap between secondary and
primary education or less. The pattern is remarkably strong in LAC, in
which 25.3 percent of individuals with tertiary education save for old age,
compared to 11.9 percent and 8.6 percent of individuals with secondary and
primary education or less, respectively.
Figure 7.5 presents the age distribution of old age saving around the
world. We distinguish between six groups, age 18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55,
56–65, and 65+. The 2014 Global Findex data indicate that 10.1 percent of
individuals aged 18–25 save for old age, a ﬁgure that rises to 21 percent for
those aged 26–35 and to 31 percent for those aged 36–45. Of the group
aged 46–55, 33.3 percent save for old age and so do another 36.9 percent of
the 56–65 group. The ﬁgure for those aged 65+ is close to that for the 56–65
group, at 36.5 percent. In EAP, the proportion of people saving for old age
at age 26–35 is 31.9 percent, compared to half that, 16.3 percent, at age
18–25. In comparison, in ECA, the tiny ﬁgure of 3.6 percent at age 18–25
rises to 6.2 percent at age 26–35 and 8.2 percent at 36–45. A jump to 14.2
percent of the population occurs at age 45–55, with a further 20.8 percent of
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Figure 7.5 Saving rates (%) for old age around the world by age and region
Note : Global FINDEX data 2015  Weighted averages.
Source : Derived from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015).
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the age group 56–65 saving for old age. The ECA ﬁgure is the highest for the
65+ group, at 29.6 percent, indicating that saving for old age peaks late.
In OECDHI, the proportion of the population saving for old age rises
sharply to 39.6 percent at age 26–35 and to 48.2 percent at age 36–45. The
ﬁgures remain at 45.6 percent and 48 percent for ages 46–55 and 56–65,
respectively. The ﬁgure for the 65+ age group is 40 percent. Notably, ﬁgures
for the other four groups of countries—LAC, MENA, South Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa—are strikingly low and remain so across the early age
groups.
Aside from age patterns, we also have data by marital and family status
around the world and for the regions of interest. Figure 7.6 shows that 12.6
percent of singles save for old age, compared to 29.3 percent of married
people and 25.9 percent of those who are widowed/divorced/separated.
Concerning family status, 21.2 percent of individuals with children younger
than 15 save for old age, compared to 29.7 percent of individuals with no
children younger than 15. Across all regions, married groups are more likely
to save for old age.
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Figure 7.6 Saving rates (%) for old age around the world by family status and region
Note : Weighted averages. The ﬁgures at the top of the bars report the magnitude of the
difference between: (a) single and married individuals in red (in both percentage points and
as a percentage in the parenthesis), and (b) individuals with children younger than 15 and
those with no children younger than 15.
Source : Adapted from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/8/2016, SPi
130 Retirement System Risk Management
Next we examine the distribution of saving for old age by real (PPP-divided)
household income per capita centile. The centiles presented in Figure 7.7
are for the global distribution of household-income-per-capita (not by
country). As expected, the results show considerable inequality in the
degree of ﬁnancial preparedness for old age. Globally, 9.7 percent of
individuals in the bottom income centile save for old age, compared to
14.4 percent in the second centile, 28.3 percent in the third income centile,
35.3 percent in the fourth centile, and 43.9 percent in the top income
centile. In OECDHI countries, old age saving rates are very high for the
fourth and ﬁfth income centiles. The ﬁgures for EAP and ECA also show
considerably higher saving rates for old age, after the third income centile.
Income inequality appears to have the most signiﬁcant impact on saving for
old age in LAC and MENA, with low rates of old age saving in the ﬁrst four
income centiles, and large measures for the top income centile.
Figure 7.8 depicts ﬁtted lines from a ﬁfth order local polynomial regres-
sion of old age saving on log GDP per capita in Panel A,13 and household
income per capita percentile (by country) in Panel B. Panel A indicates a
positive and mildly concave relationship between real GDP-per-capita levels
of US$400 and $3,000, corresponding to rates of old age saving of between
8 and 17 percent, respectively. The relationship then becomes steeply
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Figure 7.7 Saving rates (%) for old age around the world by household income per
capita (global ranking) and region
Note : Global FINDEX data 2015 – Weighted averages.
Source : Adapted from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015).
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Figure 7.8 Probability of saving for old age by income
Source : Authors’ calculations using Global FINDEX data 2015.
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convex, with the maximum occurring at real GDP per capita levels of
around $50,000, and rates of old age saving just under 50 percent. The
rates of saving for old age then drop for GDP per capita above $50,000, to
between 40 and 48 percent. By comparison, Panel B depicts a more or less
linear relationship between old age saving and household income per capita
percentile across countries. The rates of saving for old age are around 13
percent at the bottom household-income-per-capita percentile, to around
30 percent at the 97th percentile.
Finally, we differentiate saving patterns for old age across different labor
market groups—self-employed, wage employed, unemployed, and out of
the workforce—in Figure 7.9. There are striking differences between
employed adults versus adults out of the workforce. The weighted global
ﬁgures for old age saving by labor market status are 33 percent for those in
paid employment, 27.4 percent for the self-employed, 17.1 percent for those
out of workforce, and 11.2 percent for the unemployed.
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Figure 7.9 Saving for old age around the world by labor market status and region
Source: Authors’ calculations using Global FINDEX data 2015 – weighted averages.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/8/2016, SPi
Saving for Old Age around the World 133
Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis entails several stages. First we regress the probability
of saving for old age on a rich set of individual characteristics. These include
gender, urban/rural region of residence, age (ﬁve groups), education
(three groups), marital status (three groups), having ﬁnancially dependent
children, household-income-per-capita-centile (by country), and labor mar-
ket status (four groups). In the primary speciﬁcations we incorporate
region-ﬁxed effects (eight groups), while we also estimate speciﬁcations
with country-ﬁxed effects for robustness (143 groups).14
Second, in extended models, we also include control variables for ﬁnan-
cial inclusion (owning an account at a bank or formal ﬁnancial institution),
having an outstanding housing loan (as a proxy for home ownership), and
generic savings by country (having any savings during the last year, as a
proxy for cultural factors shaping the propensity to save). We also estimate
multinomial models of old age saving by ﬁnancial inclusion status, and type
of savings (formal versus informal/semi-formal).15
Third, we expand the models to incorporate country-level macroeco-
nomic characteristics. From the World Development Indicators (WDI), we
gather measures for the logarithm of life expectancy, the logarithm of per
capita GDP (2011 PPP-constant levels), GDP per capita growth, the real
interest rate (e.g., James and Song 2001), and the WDI legal rights index. In
additional speciﬁcations, we also include control variables for legal origin
(La Porta et al. 2008), the housing-affordability index (as a proxy for poten-
tial home ownership),16 and indicators for explicit deposit insurance and
the safety net/moral hazard index (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2014).
Fourth, we incorporate variables accounting for country pension-system
characteristics, in addition to the individual and macroeconomic variables.
We utilize two sources of data to capture features of pension systems. Several
are derived from the Pension Watch/HelpAge’s Social Pensions Database:17
the logarithm of the beneﬁt (in PPP international dollars), the beneﬁt as a
percentage of GDP per capita, the beneﬁt as a percentage of the $1.25 per
day poverty line, the percentage of the population over 60 covered by
pension schemes, the cost of pension spending as a percentage of the
country’s GDP, and the logarithm of the age of eligibility. Others come
from the World Bank Pensions database,18 including the percentage con-
tribution rate and the ratio of employer/employee contributions.
Results and analysis
Our comparison of individuals who save for old age versus those who do
not19 suggests that individuals who do save for old age are more likely to be
males, reside in an urban region, have tertiary or secondary education, and
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to be in the older age groups. They are less likely to be in the age range
18–35, to be single or never married, to have children aged under 15, and to
have primary education or less. Savers are also higher income and
employed, and less likely to be self-employed, unemployed, or inactive.
Old age savers are also more likely to be ﬁnancially included and to have
an outstanding mortgage. They tend to reside in countries with higher
generic savings rates and in countries with higher GDP per capita. They
reside in countries with lower GDP growth rates, higher legal rights index,
and lower real interest rates. Savers for old age are less likely to be found in
countries with French legal origin and more likely to be found in countries
with English or German legal origin. Residents of countries that offer some
form of explicit deposit insurance scheme are more likely to save for old age,
as are individuals in countries with a higher safety net/moral hazard index.
Old age savers are also found in countries with higher life expectancy,
higher age of beneﬁt eligibility, higher beneﬁts, higher coverage, and
higher pension costs. Finally, they are more likely to be residents of coun-
tries with higher contribution rates and lower employer/employee contri-
bution ratios.
Table 7.1 presents estimates for the determinants of the probability of
saving for old age around the world. The list of explanatory variables
incorporates individual characteristics. All regressions show marginal effects
from probit regressions, with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at
the country level. Estimates are weighted using country-level weights. The
results reveal a gender gap in savings for old age of 3.7 percent, based on the
predicted probability of the model and the speciﬁcation with the full set of
control variables (column 4). The magnitude of the gap remains similar
when incorporating country-ﬁxed effects in column 5. The difference
between urban and rural regions in saving for old age is insigniﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations. The results also reveal a signiﬁcant education gap in saving
for old age. Individuals with tertiary education are 18.5 percent more
likely to save for old age, compared to individuals with primary education
or less. Moreover, individuals with secondary education are roughly 11.1
percent more likely to save for old age, compared to those with primary
education or less.
Table 7.1 also shows large age differentials. For example, in column 4,
individuals older than 65 are 85.1 percent more likely to save for old age,
compared to the reference group age 18–25. The relative magnitudes are
77.2 percent for those age 56–65, 53.4 percent for those age 46–55, 41.8
percent for those age 36–45, and 21.8 percent for individuals aged 26–35.
Married individuals are roughly 13.7 percent more likely to save for old age,
while those having children under the age of 15 are somewhat more likely to
save for old age (4.8 percent). Moreover, individuals in the top income
centile (ﬁfth) by country are 20.1 percent more likely to save for old age,
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TABLE 7.1. Saving for old age and ﬁnancial inclusion, probit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.009*** 0.007** 0.006* 0.007** 0.007**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Urban region 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]
Education: Tertiary 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.039***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Education: Secondary 0.054*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.026***
[0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Education: Primary or less [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.]
Age: 65 or more 0.179*** 0.160*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.159***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012]
Age: 56 to 65 0.164*** 0.149*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.141***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Age: 46 to 55 0.118*** 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.097***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
Age: 36 to 45 0.098*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.075***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
Age: 26 to 35 0.052*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.036***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Age: 18 to 25 [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.]
Married 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.029***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.01 0.016***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Single [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.]
Has children under 15 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.009* 0.009**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Household income per capita 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.036***
centile by country: [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
4th centile 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.017***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
3rd centile [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.]
2nd centile 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
bottom centile 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.046***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Self-employed 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.050***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005]
Wage employed 0.079*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.059***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006]
Unemployed 0.024** 0.026** 0.025** 0.017* 0.016**
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008]
Out of workforce [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.]
Has any account  0.120*** 0.115*** 0.101*** 0.108***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006]
Outstanding mortgage   0.052*** 0.043*** 0.045***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005]
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/8/2016, SPi
136 Retirement System Risk Management
compared to those in the third income centile. Individuals in the fourth
income centile are 9.5 percent more likely to save for old age, compared to
individuals in the third. Individuals in the second and bottom (ﬁrst) income
centile are 14.8 percent and 25.9 percent less likely to save for old age,
compared to those in the third income centile.20
With respect to occupational groups, self-employed individuals are 24.3
percent more likely to be old age savers compared to the inactive group.
Individuals in paid employment are about 30.7 percent more likely, while
the unemployed are roughly 9 percent less likely to save for old age com-
pared to the inactive. Financially included individuals around the world are
about 53.4 percent more likely to be old age savers, while individuals who
have an outstanding mortgage are roughly 22.9 percent more likely. Hence,
having a mortgage for home ownership, as an alternative means of old
age security, does not appear to reduce the probability of saving for
old age, in our global sample.21
Country-speciﬁc generic savings rates have very large effects on the prob-
ability of an individual saving for old age. This supports other researchers’
suggestions that cultural factors affect the individuals’ attention to future
events (Chen 2013). The magnitudes of the estimates do not differ substan-
tially when excluding the group older than 65 years old in column 5, or
when incorporating country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects (excluding the country-
speciﬁc generic savings variable).
Table 7.2 presents estimates from multinomial probit models for old age
savings, distinguishing by the individual state of ﬁnancial inclusion, and the
type of saving: formal versus informal. Results in columns A1–A3 report
marginal effects for individuals who: (1) save for old age and have an
account at a bank or another ﬁnancial institution; (2) save for old age but
do not have an account at a formal ﬁnancial institution (i.e., save in some
other way, such as gold, other assets, or in the home); and (3) do not save for
old age. Results conﬁrm that men are more likely to save for old age in
general, by 4.4 percent (6.6) more among the ﬁnancially included
(excluded). Educated and urban residents are both more likely to be
Saved any money last year    0.463*** 
[country average] [0.040]
Country FE     +
Predicted probability 0.1891 0.1892 0.1892 0.1891 0.1891
No. of observations 147,690 147,690 147,690 147,690 147,690
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.168 0.171 0.195 0.214
Log-likelihood 61,069.5 59,769.9 59,562.2 57,870.6 56,473.4
LR χ2 1,922.4*** 1,948.3*** 2,116.5*** 3,593.3*** 5,195.2***
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source : Authors’ calculations from Global FINDEX data 2015—weighted averages.
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TABLE 7.2. Saving for old age (OA) and ﬁnancial inclusion, multinomial probit
regressions
(A) SavingOA & ﬁnancial
inclusion
(B) SavingOA & type of savings
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
FIncl FExcl NoSavingOA FormalS InformalS NoSavingOA
Male 0.007*** 0.002* 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.004**
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Urban region 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.004** 0.002** 0.006***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Education: Tertiary 0.045*** 0.009*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.003** 0.043***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
Education: Secondary 0.070*** 0.010*** 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.008*** 0.060***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
Age: 65 or more 0.155*** 0.028*** 0.182*** 0.111*** 0.018*** 0.129***
[0.005] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005]
Age: 56 to 65 0.149*** 0.018*** 0.166*** 0.112*** 0.014*** 0.127***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004]
age: 46 to 55 0.111*** 0.008*** 0.119*** 0.087*** 0.011*** 0.098***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004]
Age: 36 to 45 0.099*** 0.001 0.101*** 0.077*** 0.009*** 0.087***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004]
Age: 26 to 35 0.057*** 0.002 0.055*** 0.043*** 0.006*** 0.048***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004]
Married 0.028*** 0.003 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.004*** 0.026***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
Widowed/divorced/
separated
0.001 0.005** 0.003 0.007** 0.004** 0.003
[0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004]
Has children under 15 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.003 0.001 0.003*** 0.004*
[0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
Household income
per capita
0.035*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.009*** 0.034***
centile by county: [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
4th centile 0.014*** 0.004** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.017***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
2nd centile 0.029*** 0.001 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.005*** 0.029***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
bottom centile 0.048*** 0.004** 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.009*** 0.054***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004]
Self-employed 0.043*** 0.009*** 0.052*** 0.031*** 0.013*** 0.044***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]
In paid employment 0.077*** 0.001 0.076*** 0.053*** 0.017*** 0.069***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
Unemployed 0.024*** 0.001 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.001 0.032***
[0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005] [0.002] [0.005]
Predicted probability 0.1587 0.0303 0.8110 0.1042 0.0942 0.8016
No. of observations 147,690 137,511
F-statistic 70,074.8 49,240.6
LR χ2 17,431.1*** 14,947.7***
Note : Marginal effects from multinomial probit regressions are presented, along with robust
standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Asterisks denote
the following levels of signiﬁcance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source : Authors’ calculations from Global FINDEX data 2015—weighted averages.
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ﬁnancially included and save for old age. Older persons and married
individuals are also more likely to save for old age and be ﬁnancially
included, while the ﬁnancially excluded do so only after their mid-40s.
Columns B1–B3 report estimates for individuals who respectively: (1) save
for old age and have saved in the past 12 months using an account at a
formal ﬁnancial institution; (2) save for old age and have saved in the past 12
months informally or semi-formally, using an informal savings club or
person outside the family (without saving at a formal ﬁnancial institution);
and (3) do not save for old age. Results show that men are 4.8 percent more
likely to save for old age formally. The widowed/divorced/separated and
those with children aged under 15 are more likely to save for old age
informally and semi-formally, with the magnitude of the effects being 4.2
and 3.2 percent respectively. Individuals with missing income information
are the income group most likely to save for old age informally, and they are
less likely to do so using an account at a formal ﬁnancial institution.
Table 7.3 reports estimates frommodels that incorporate macroeconomic
country-level variables. Here we see that people living in countries having
English legal origins are between 18.5 and 29.6 percent more likely to save
for old age, compared to regions having French legal origin. Those from
countries with other legal origin (Scandinavian or socialist) are more likely
to save for old age, compared to regions with French or German legal origin,
and the effects are of similar magnitude to the English legal origin effect.
GDP per capita is positively associated with the probability of saving for old
age, with a one standard deviation increase raising the probability by about
20 percent. All remaining macroeconomic variables have insigniﬁcant
impacts on saving for old age for the pooled group of countries, with the
notable exception of the safety net/moral hazard index, which is positively
associated with the probability of saving for old age: a one standard deviation
increase raises the probability by 4.6 percent. We interpret this last result as
supportive of the view that an institutional environment enabling greater
trust in the ﬁnancial system also encourages old age saving.
When we incorporated country pension-system characteristics to the
model (Table 7.4), we found that more generous pension schemes are
generally insigniﬁcantly (and negatively) correlated with old age saving.
Yet higher contribution rates and employer/employee ratios are both sig-
niﬁcantly positively related to the probability of saving for old age. The latter
result is intuitive, but we interpret the former as consistent with Poterba
et al. (1995) who suggest little substitution between regular retirement
savings and other forms of conventional ﬁnancial saving.
Since effects by region of the main variables may vary across country
groups, Table 7.5 presents estimates by region for the determinants of
saving for old age around the world. Here we see that greater life expectancy
is positively associated with the probability of saving for old age in OECDHI,
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TABLE 7.3. Saving for old age and country macroeconomic characteristics, probit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of life expectancy –0.002 0.071 0.004 0.015 0.003 0.009 0.011 0.040
German legal origin 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.018]
Other legal origin 0.041** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046***
[0.020] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016]
Log(GDP per capita)  0.039*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040***
- PPP constant 2011 [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010]
GDP per capita growth   0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
WDI Legal Rights Index    0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Housing affordability index     0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Missing affordability index     0.014 0.015 0.015 0.01
[0.027] [0.026] [0.028] [0.026]
Real interest rate      0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Deposit insurance dummy       0.003 
[0.018]
Moral hazard index        0.008**
[0.004]
Has any account 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.100***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Outstanding mortgage 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Individual characteristics + + + + + + + +
Predicted probability 0.1892 0.1896 0.1895 0.1895 0.1895 0.1895 0.1895 0.1732
No. of observations 147,690 141,655 141,655 141,655 141,655 141,655 141,655 85,817
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.180 0.180 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.192
Log-likelihood 59,296.8 56,621.9 56,558.2 56,547.0 56,534.5 56,530.1 56,529.5 39,463.8
Note : * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source : Authors’ calculations from Global FINDEX data 2015—weighted averages.
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TABLE 7.4. Saving for old age and country pension-system characteristics: probit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log beneﬁt in PPP US$ 0.004   0.046*** 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.009**
[0.003] [0.017] [0.004] [0.011] [0.003] [0.004]
Beneﬁt as % of GDP per capita  0.095      
[0.086]
Beneﬁt as % of the $1.25/day   0.001     
poverty line [0.001]
Cost of pension spending as    0.003    
% GDP [0.006]
% population over 60     0.029 0.027 0.043* 0.052**
covered [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.024]
Log age of eligibility      0.004  
[0.011]
Contribution rate %       0.172** 
[0.067]
Employer/employee        0.006***
contribution ratio [0.002]
Has any account 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.130*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.111*** 0.116***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008]
Outstanding mortgage 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.045***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
Predicted probability 0.1873 0.1874 0.1873 0.2501 0.1874 0.1874 0.1898 0.1879
No. of observations 133,146 133,146 133,146 57,345 133,146 133,146 106,929 133,146
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.185 0.187 0.173 0.188 0.188 0.192 0.186
Log-likelihood 52,368.4 52,533.6 52,381.0 26,895.4 52,348.3 52,345.7 41,992.8 54,728.1
Note : * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source : Authors’ calculations from Global FINDEX data 2015—weighted averages.
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TABLE 7.5. Saving for old age and regional differences, probit regressions
EAP ECA OECDHI LAC MENA South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of life expectancy 3.724*** 1.739*** 1.987*** 0.862*** 2.489*** 0.268** 0.038
[0.208] [0.359] [0.750] [0.328] [0.112] [0.118] [0.061]
English legal origin 0.127***  0.076 0.153***  0.128*** 0.015
[0.021] [0.057] [0.047] [0.011] [0.013]
German legal origin 0.621*** 0.088*** 0.066    
[0.034] [0.021] [0.043]
Other legal origin  0.052 0.016  0.062***  0.007
[0.045] [0.038] [0.013] [0.011]
Log(GDP per capita) 0.277*** 0.046** 0.042 0.038* 1.142*** 0.001 0.027***
- PPP constant 2011 [0.013] [0.020] [0.060] [0.021] [0.035] [0.012] [0.005]
GDP per capita growth 0.143*** 0.012** 0.008 0.002 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.008***
[0.009] [0.006] [0.014] [0.002] [0.006] [0.003] [0.001]
WDI legal rights index 0.005*** 0.007** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.141*** 0.011*** 0.002
[0.002] [0.003] [0.007] [0.002] [0.018] [0.003] [0.003]
Real interest rate  0.009*** 0.001 0.001 0.028***  0.001
[0.002] [0.009] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Housing affordability index 0.583*** 0.133*** 0.039* 0.113*** 0.619*** 0.037*** 0.001
[0.017] [0.036] [0.020] [0.014] [0.088] [0.010] [0.010]
Outstanding mortgage 0.035*** 0.016 0.052*** 0.033*** 0.022 0.058 0.054***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.038] [0.008]
Has any account 0.138*** 0.056*** 0.101*** 0.115*** 0.051*** 0.087*** 0.096***
[0.023] [0.007] [0.021] [0.008] [0.006] [0.015] [0.006]
Male 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.026*** 0.006 0.007 0.006
[0.010] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.016] [0.004]
Urban region 0.040** 0.004 0.029*** 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.013**
[0.020] [0.007] [0.010] [0.009] [0.007] [0.016] [0.006]
Education: Tertiary 0.014 0.032*** 0.058*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.013 0.033***
[0.042] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] [0.006] [0.012] [0.009]
Education: Secondary 0.026* 0.001 0.065*** 0.025*** 0.001 0.024* 0.014**
[0.015] [0.011] [0.014] [0.009] [0.003] [0.012] [0.006]
Age: 65 or more 0.267*** 0.175*** 0.206*** 0.101*** 0.083*** 0.096*** 0.099***
[0.063] [0.026] [0.031] [0.024] [0.011] [0.013] [0.011]
Age: 56 to 65 0.251*** 0.132*** 0.228*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.073*** 0.078***
[0.077] [0.029] [0.026] [0.017] [0.008] [0.018] [0.011]
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Age: 46 to 55 0.189*** 0.078*** 0.169*** 0.071*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.049***
[0.051] [0.026] [0.023] [0.016] [0.004] [0.015] [0.011]
Age: 36 to 45 0.156*** 0.037 0.145*** 0.061*** 0.024* 0.054*** 0.027***
[0.055] [0.026] [0.024] [0.015] [0.013] [0.011] [0.008]
Age: 26 to 35 0.071** 0.003 0.079*** 0.033** 0.001 0.028 0.01
[0.032] [0.019] [0.021] [0.014] [0.010] [0.018] [0.008]
Married 0.066*** 0.040*** 0.055*** 0.014* 0.004 0.027*** 0.023***
[0.023] [0.009] [0.011] [0.008] [0.013] [0.010] [0.007]
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.005 0.034*** 0.009 0.021 0.013* 0.064*** 0.017**
[0.029] [0.010] [0.013] [0.020] [0.008] [0.023] [0.008]
Single [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.]
Has children under 15 0.030** 0.023 0.025*** 0.004 0.019 0.006 0.008*
[0.012] [0.015] [0.009] [0.008] [0.013] [0.011] [0.005]
Household income per capita 0.016** 0.024** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.024*** 0.02 0.040***
centile by country: [0.007] [0.012] [0.013] [0.010] [0.004] [0.015] [0.006]
4th centile 0.006 0.007 0.030** 0.027** 0.013** 0.003 0.024***
[0.004] [0.011] [0.014] [0.013] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006]
2nd centile 0.087*** 0.001 0.056*** 0.019** 0.016** 0.017* 0.001
[0.018] [0.013] [0.012] [0.009] [0.007] [0.010] [0.008]
bottom centile 0.143*** 0.025** 0.083*** 0.010 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.01
[0.036] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.013] [0.010] [0.007]
Self-employed 0.059*** 0.025** 0.104*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 0.029***
[0.023] [0.013] [0.019] [0.007] [0.010] [0.012] [0.006]
In paid employment 0.073*** 0.002 0.124*** 0.040** 0.025*** 0.067*** 0.061***
[0.016] [0.010] [0.013] [0.016] [0.008] [0.014] [0.008]
Unemployed 0.019 0.003 0.039* 0.014 0.028* 0.060** 0.016*
[0.057] [0.020] [0.021] [0.012] [0.017] [0.024] [0.009]
Out of workforce [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.] [Ref.]
Predicted probability 0.3470 0.1129 0.3627 0.1399 0.0667 0.0916 0.0901
No. of observations 11,184 21,040 30,119 15,536 9,069 9,132 33,042
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.153 0.115 0.128 0.170 0.133 0.216
Log-likelihood 6,505.2 6,281.5 17,458.3 5,485.0 1,844.9 2,426.4 7,844.8
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: Authors’ calculations from Global FINDEX data 2015—weighted averages.
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LAC, and South Asia. The effect is much higher in OECDHI, but it is
negative in EAP, ECA, and MENA. Higher GDP per capita and higher per
capita growth both are positively linked to saving for old age in the MENA
and Sub-Saharan Africa, but there is no signiﬁcant effect in OECDHI coun-
tries. (It is mixed in the remaining regions.) The probability of old age
saving is higher in countries with higher legal-rights indexes in EAP,
OECDHI, LAC, and MENA. Higher real interest rates are positively linked
to old age saving in Sub-Saharan Africa, but negatively in ECA. A greater
housing affordability index is positively related to saving for old age in the
majority of regions, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, where there is
no association.
We also examine additional factors associated with old age saving around
the world, by region. Our results (see Table 7A.3, in the Appendix) indicate
that deposit insurance schemes are positively related to saving for old age in
ECA but negatively related in MENA. Moreover, higher beneﬁts are only
negatively related to saving for old age in MENA countries. Contribution
rates are negatively related to saving for old age only in EAP. In sum, our
results largely conﬁrm the view of limited substitutability between regular
retirement savings and other forms of conventional ﬁnancial saving.
Conclusion
The looming worldwide retirement crisis has policymakers scrambling to
better understand how adults prepare ﬁnancially for old age. This chapter
offers the ﬁrst detailed global inquiry into patterns of old age saving around
the world and across country groups, drawing on new and richmicro-data.We
ﬁnd that 24.8 percent of individuals around the world save for old age, with
large regional differences: rates are above 35 percent in OECDHI and EAP,
11.8 percent in ECA, 10.6 percent in LAC, and below 10 percent in Sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia, and MENA. We also found a small gender gap in
saving for old age overall, which is larger in developing counties. Most regions
exhibit patterns of higher saving for old age among those with higher educa-
tion, with EAP standing out as the sole exception. In every region except
South Asia, employed adults are more likely to save for old age than
unemployed adults. Saving for old age also rises sharply among the 36–45
age group. Our ﬁndings also reveal large income disparities: adults in the top
income centiles are far more likely, while the lowest income are much less
likely, to save for old age. Adults who have an account at a bank or a ﬁnancial
institution are about 40 to 50 percent more likely to save for old age.
On the country level, we also uncover a signiﬁcant and positive relation-
ship between old age saving and the country’s generic saving propensity,
English legal origin, and GDP per capita. Institutional arrangements also
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help when they enable greater trust in the ﬁnancial system. Finally, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcantly positive relationship between the probability of saving for old
age and pension coverage, the size of contributions, and contribution ratios.
More affordable housing is positively related to saving for old age every-
where except Sub-Saharan Africa. We interpret this as evidence suggesting
little substitution between pension system provisions and contribution rates,
other forms of ﬁnancial saving, and saving for old age.
Appendix
TABLE 7A.1. Summary statistics by region
EAP ECA OECDHI LAC MENA South
Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Units
Male (%) 49.2 47.7 48.5 48.6 49.8 50.3 49.2
Urban region (%) 31.4 35.7 44.7 38.7 62.0 14.9 23.1
Education: Tertiary (%) 10.2 13.9 21.1 12.2 8.1 3.4 3.0
Education: Secondary (%) 49.3 72.2 82.5 63.2 53.1 37.1 34.3
Education: Primary or
less
(%) 50.4 27.3 15.8 36.5 46.7 62.9 65.3
Age: 65+ (%) 7.0 11.9 17.5 8.2 3.8 5.9 5.0
Age: 56 to 65 (%) 11.1 12.7 15.6 9.0 7.3 9.5 6.6
Age: 46 to 55 (%) 16.0 16.1 17.6 13.0 11.9 11.1 10.3
Age: 36 to 45 (%) 20.8 17.5 17.2 17.3 17.5 16.6 16.4
Age: 26 to 35 (%) 21.8 18.3 15.7 22.5 23.9 23.4 24.7
Age: 18 to 25 (%) 17.5 16.3 12.0 22.0 26.9 25.3 25.9
Married (%) 69.5 60.3 57.6 51.8 54.3 67.8 51.3
Widowed/divorced/
separated
(%) 5.7 13.3 12.9 10.3 4.6 6.4 10.6
Single (%) 24.8 26.4 29.6 38.0 41.1 25.8 38.1
Has children under 15 (%) 48.9 40.4 28.8 38.9 45.9 69.6 66.3
HH income per capita
centile by country:
(%) 13.2 12.6 15.0 10.8 10.9 15.0 12.0
4th centile (%) 18.5 15.2 16.9 12.0 13.7 17.6 15.1
3rd centile (%) 19.9 17.5 18.7 13.2 15.0 20.0 17.5
2nd centile (%) 18.5 18.9 20.8 14.6 18.1 22.2 19.7
bottom centile (%) 22.6 21.6 25.2 16.0 20.2 25.2 21.1
missing centile (%) 7.3 14.3 3.4 33.3 22.2 0.0 14.7
Self-employed (%) 38.8 17.7 10.5 23.1 16.7 27.9 38.8
Employed (%) 28.9 32.2 45.3 30.2 21.5 19.1 18.2
Unemployed (%) 29.9 43.2 38.7 37.8 51.0 48.0 34.0
Inactive (%) 2.5 6.9 5.6 8.9 10.7 5.0 8.9
Has any account (%) 62.4 45.8 93.5 44.5 33.0 40.6 30.0
(%) 67.0 37.1 70.1 47.4 38.6 39.1 58.0
(continued)
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TABLE 7A.1. Continued
EAP ECA OECDHI LAC MENA South
Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Any savings last year
(country average)
Outstanding mortgage (%) 9.9 11.2 27.6 10.4 9.6 5.4 5.2
Log (GDP per capita—
PPP divided)
9.15 9.23 10.51 9.15 9.22 8.37 7.89
GDP per capita growth 6.47 4.42 0.76 3.65 1.71 5.27 5.22
WDR legal rights index 4.43 5.90 5.87 4.49 1.23 5.54 5.15
Legal origin: English (%) 14.6 0.0 20.0 6.1 0.0 89.1 38.2
Legal origin: French (%) 29.2 71.3 30.1 93.9 89.0 11.0 55.9
Legal origin: German (%) 48.8 24.0 26.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Legal origin: Other (%) 7.4 4.8 23.3 0.0 11.0 0.0 5.9
Real interest rate 3.96 8.10 1.12 5.56 3.94 5.08 5.09
Missing real interest
rate
(%) 15.9 19.0 59.9 12.1 22.7 11.5 55.9
Deposit insurance (%) 47.2 95.3 90.0 69.7 44.1 77.9 32.4
Safety net/moral
hazard index{
0.59 0.81 1.07 2.32 0.07 0.52 0.34
Life expectancy 72.68 72.50 80.68 74.16 72.19 67.66 57.90
Beneﬁt in PPP US${ 34.13 86.84 614.85 144.21 62.00 9.25 95.86
Beneﬁt as % of GDP
per capita{
(%) 4.2 11.7 20.3 13.5 21.0 4.7 14.9
Beneﬁt as % of $1.25/
day pov. line{
(%) 90.0 228.6 1,617.2 379.2 162.0 24.9 252.1
Cost of pension
spending as % GDP{
(%) 0.09 1.07 1.48 0.27 0.06 0.10 0.70
% population 60+
covered{
(%) 31.1 33.4 30.6 25.4 10.0 20.7 65.5
Age of eligibility{ 62.29 62.16 64.85 64.38 60.00 62.77 62.14
Employer/employee
contribution ratio{
1.91 7.63 1.94 2.70 3.33 3.03 4.01
% contribution rate (%) 16.9 26.6 28.3 23.0 24.0 26.6 16.9
Note : Variables marked with the symbol ({) have missing observations. For region deﬁnitions,
see text.
Source: Authors’ calculations from Global FINDEX data 2015—weighted averages.
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TABLE 7A.2. Summary statistics by old age (OA) saving status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All
countries
SavingOA Not
SavingOA
Diff. [Sig.]
#of Observations 147,692 30,395 117,297
Male 49.0% 52.3% 48.3% 0.0397 ***
Urban region 37.3% 41.8% 36.2% 0.0561 ***
Education: Tertiary 12.4% 21.8% 10.2% 0.1160 ***
Education: Secondary 59.9% 73.0% 56.9% 0.1614 ***
Education: Primary or less 39.4% 26.2% 42.5% 0.1626 ***
Age: 65+ 9.8% 14.6% 8.7% 0.0590 ***
Age: 56 to 65 10.7% 16.8% 9.2% 0.0756 ***
Age: 46 to 55 14.1% 19.1% 13.0% 0.0610 ***
Age: 36 to 45 17.5% 20.7% 16.8% 0.0387 ***
Age: 26 to 35 21.0% 17.8% 21.8% 0.0399 ***
Age: 18 to 25 19.4% 9.3% 21.8% 0.1241 ***
Married 57.7% 68.8% 55.1% 0.1370 ***
Widowed/divorced/separated 10.5% 11.4% 10.3% 0.0116 ***
Single 31.8% 19.8% 34.6% 0.1486 ***
Has children under 15 45.6% 36.8% 47.7% 0.1094 ***
Household income per capita centile: 12.8% 18.6% 11.5% 0.0711 ***
4th centile 15.4% 19.4% 14.4% 0.0493 ***
3rd centile 17.3% 18.9% 16.9% 0.0203 ***
2nd centile 18.9% 16.4% 19.5% 0.0312 ***
bottom centile 21.4% 15.6% 22.8% 0.0715 ***
missing centile 14.2% 11.1% 15.0% 0.0380 ***
Self-employed 23.3% 22.3% 23.5% 0.0114 ***
Employed 30.1% 43.5% 26.9% 0.1657 ***
Unemployed 39.8% 31.3% 41.8% 0.1053 ***
Inactive 6.9% 2.9% 7.8% 0.0490 ***
Has any account 55.5% 83.9% 48.8% 0.3509 ***
Any savings last year (country average) 54.6% 64.4% 52.3% 0.1212 ***
Outstanding mortgage 13.2% 25.0% 10.5% 0.1453 ***
Log(GDP per capita—PPP divided) 9.22 9.80 9.08 0.7150 ***
GDP per capita growth 3.75 3.22 3.88 0.6596 ***
WDR legal rights index 5.00 5.39 4.91 0.4846 ***
Legal origin: English 24.4% 27.4% 23.7% 0.0366 ***
Legal origin: French 52.8% 37.1% 56.4% 0.0412 ***
Legal origin: German 14.7% 22.5% 12.9% 0.0963 ***
Legal origin: other 8.1% 13.0% 7.0% 0.1926 ***
Real interest rate 4.34 3.15 4.62 1.4614 ***
Deposit insurance 66.5% 73.3% 64.9% 0.0014 **
Moral hazard index{ 0.17 0.71 0.03 0.6808 ***
Life expectancy 71.11 75.11 70.19 4.9177 ***
Beneﬁt in PPP US${ 256.36 353.02 227.06 125.9557 ***
Beneﬁt as % of GDP per capita{ 13.7% 14.3% 13.5% 0.0075 ***
Beneﬁt as % of $1.25 a day pov. line{ 674.4% 928.6% 597.3% 331.3 ***
Cost of pension spending as % GDP{ 0.68% 0.89% 0.61% 0.2808 ***
% population 60+ covered{ 31.1% 34.1% 30.1% 0.0403 ***
Age of eligibility{ 63.52 63.59 63.50 0.0960 ***
Employer/employee contribution ratio{ 3.42 2.94 3.53 0.5902 ***
% contribution rate{ 23.5% 24.6% 23.3% 0.0136 ***
Note : Weighted averages in columns 1–3. Weighted mean differences in column 4 and levels of
signiﬁcance of the differences are from a t-test for weighted mean differences with unequal
variances produced using the parmby and metaparm commands in Stata. Variables marked with
the symbol ({) have missing observations. Asterisks denote the following levels of signiﬁcance:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source : Authors’ calculations from Global FINDEX data 2015—weighted averages.
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TABLE 7A.3. Additional models of saving for old age and regional differences, probit regressions
EAP ECA OECDHI LAC MENA South Asia Sub-Saharan
Africa
Panel A: Saving for old age by region and deposit insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deposit Insurance dummy  0.176*** 0.031 0.004 0.212***  0.006
[0.027] [0.053] [0.018] [0.005] [0.008]
Predicted probability 0.3470 0.1129 0.3627 0.1399 0.0667 0.0916 0.0901
No. of observations 11,184 21,040 30,119 15,536 9,069 9,132 33,042
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.145 0.115 0.127 0.170 0.133 0.215
Panel B: Saving for old age by region and pension-system characteristics
(9) (10) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Log beneﬁt in PPP US$ 0.026* 2.626*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.082*** 0.031 0.012***
[0.015] [0.053] [0.010] [0.001] [0.004] [0.078] [0.004]
% population over 60 covered 0.091 216.423*** 0.003 0.320***  0.304 0.042
[0.103] [6.358] [0.059] [0.029] [0.614] [0.035]
Contribution rate (%) 0.195*** 25.968*** 0.709*** 1.147*** 5.905*** 0.090 0.144
[0.070] [0.535] [0.163] [0.088] [0.267] [0.350] [0.099]
Predicted probability 0.3753 0.1294 0.3557 0.1393 0.0702 0.0969 0.0908
No. of observations 5,000 14,036 26,114 14,528 8,069 6,112 27,040
Pseudo R2 0.141 0.148 0.12 0.136 0.168 0.118 0.225
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source : Authors’ calculations from Global FINDEX data 2015—weighted averages.
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Endnotes
1. The literature does offer contrary views on retirement and wellbeing, such as
Charles (2002).
2. The author reviews how designing public policy toward retirement security must
recognize both the heterogeneity among households saving for retirement, as
well as the multiple policy objectives that are served by various policy instruments.
3. In a similar vein, the Future of Retirement report (HSBC 2013), which surveyed
1,050 respondents in the UK and more than 16,000 people across 15 coun-
tries, revealed that almost two-ﬁfths of retired UK respondents (39%) said that
they had not prepared adequately or at all for a comfortable retirement.
4. Moreover, one-third of respondents said that they had foregone some form of
medical treatment in the preceding year due to the treatment’s expected cost.
Not surprisingly, the decision not to seek treatment was more common for those
without savings, those indicating that they were struggling with their ﬁnances, or
had no insurance.
5. For a detailed investigation on the heuristics and the biases that emerge in the area
of retirement savings, see Benartzi and Thaler (2007). Other studies on retirement
planning strategies involving relevant considerations include Ameriks and Zeldes
(2004) and Brown (2007).
6. See Holzmann (2012) and Pallares-Miralles et al. (2012) for reviews of inter-
national pension systems.
7. The rationale is that by separating the redistributive function from the savings
function, the public pillar, as well as the size of the payroll tax needed to support
it, can be kept relatively small, thus avoiding many of the growth-inhibiting
problems associated with a dominant public pillar (World Bank 1994).
8. Such incentives involve tax exemptions and subsidies. These might require
changes in ﬁscal policy that can be socially costly because they increase distor-
tions. Moreover, such schemes might suffer from limited or lower coverage as well
as volume of savings, particularly among the poor, compared to the remaining
pillars. Valdés-Prieto (2002a) suggests that most third-pillar ﬁscal incentives are
regressive because the incentives are taken up mostly by higher-income workers
while the increase in general tax rates fall to some degree uponmiddle- and lower-
income workers. There is a rich literature on the effects of social security incen-
tives and provisions on labormarket distortions (e.g., Gruber andWise 1998, 2002;
Coile 2015), on the strong connections between subjective retirement expect-
ations and future work behavior (e.g., Chan and Stevens 2004), on the role of
ﬁnancial incentives on retirement choices (e.g., Kingston 2000; Belloni and Alessie
2009), and on the role of ﬂuctuations on the business cycle, ﬁnancial markets, and
the housing market on retirement choices (e.g., Crawford and Lilien 1981; Coile
and Levine 2010).
9. The complete database is available at: <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/
ﬁnancialinclusion>.
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10. The survey is conducted in the major languages of each country. The target
population is the entire civilian, non-institutionalized population age 15 and
above. Data weighting is used to ensure a nationally representative sample for
each economy. Final weights consist of the base sampling weight, which corrects
for unequal probability of selection based on household size, and the poststra-
tiﬁcation weight, which corrects for sampling and nonresponse error. Poststra-
tiﬁcation weights use country-level population statistics on gender and age and,
where reliable data are available, education or socioeconomic status. In some
large economies, such as China and Russia, sample sizes of at least 4,000 are
collected. Detailed country-level information about the data collection dates,
sample sizes, excluded populations, and margins of error can be found at
<http://go.worldbank.org/IGRTPHK660>.
11. We do not exclude from the sample individuals older than 65 years old, following
the evidence in Alessie et al. (1999), who ﬁnd little evidence of decumulation
among the elderly, and only at an advanced age. The authors ﬁnd that precau-
tionary savings, bequest motives, and health are among the reasons why some
elderly do not decumulate in the pattern predicted by the life-cycle model.
12. All summary statistics are weighted country averages.
13. Data on real GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international dollars) are from
the World Development Indicators.
14. Out of the total 146 countries in the Global Findex 2014 data, Liberia, Paraguay,
and South Sudan are excluded from these speciﬁcations due to missing data on
saving for old age.
15. Across the developing world, only about 4% of adults—160 million people—are
unbanked but save by using a savings club or a person outside the family, while in
Sub-Saharan Africa the share is three times that size. On average, in the region’s
economies, 13% of adults are unbanked and save semi-formally (Demirgüç-Kunt
et al. 2015).
16. The housing affordability index is fromNumbeo (2015). The data and description
are available at: <http://www.numbeo.com/property-investment/rankings_by_
country.jsp?title=2014>.
17. The data and detailed description are available at: <http://www.pension-watch.
net/pensions/about-social-pensions/about-social-pensions/social-pensions-
database>.
18. The data are described by Pallares-Miralles et al. (2012) and are available at:
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotectionlabor/brief/pensions-data>.
19. Descriptive statistics for the main variables in the analysis of old age saving
around the world appear in Tables 7A.1 and 7A.2 in the Appendix. Column 1
presents weighted averages for the pooled sample of all countries (147,692
individuals), while columns 2 and 3 present averages for individuals who save
for old age (24.8% of the weighted sample, or 30,395 individuals) and those who
do not (75.2% of the weighted sample, or 117, 297 individuals), respectively.
Column 4 also presents the mean difference and signiﬁcance levels for tests of
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differences in the means of the variables across the two samples. Weighted mean
differences are computed and a t-test for weighted mean differences with
unequal variances produced using the parmby and metaparm commands in
Stata.
20. It is worth noting that the magnitude of the effects with respect to the income
variables does not differ much when overall equivalized household income
centiles are used, instead of centiles by country (results available upon
request).
21. Indeed, there is limited empirical evidence in favor of downsizing housing
adjustments on retirement, such as Ermisch and Jenkins (1999).
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